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Abstract 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah`s Non-Aligned policy has been a key variable in Ghana`s foreign policy, 
and successive regimes after Nhrumah have pursued this policy in various ways. Since its political 
reforms in 1992, Ghana has established itself as an anchor in political dispensation on the African 
continent. In the sub-region, Ghana is seen by other countries as a leader by exhibiting its 
competencies and maturity in political change and good governance, and its peacekeeping 
involvement in the subfield. Whiles Ghana takes credit for these attributes; her response to 
regional issues has not always been as readily forthcoming as in others. This paper seeks to analyze 
Ghana`s foreign policy directions in the sub-Saharan region, and ECOWAS. How consistent or 
inconsistent has Ghana been, in the implementation of foreign policy objectives within the 
ECOWAS, between the periods of 1992-2016? The paper leads the hypothesis that, lack of a well-
defined and articulated defence policy document has somewhat resulted in inconsistencies in 
responding to crises in the region.   
 
Keywords: ECOWAS; Foreign Policy; Ghana; Peacekeeping; ECOWAS Protocol. 
 
 
Introduction  
            The difficulty of some countries to unilaterally act in responding to external issues such as 
security, economic diplomacy and international cooperation, has somewhat led to the formation of 
various organizations in the world. These organizations play a significant political role and devote 
attention on socio-economic and other developmental activities. Hence, the countries in West 
Africa have come under one economic bloc –Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), to maximize their potentials and facilitate the realization of the benefits of economies 
of scale3 [Evans, 2007].  
            Ghana's regional integration agenda began in the 1950s. Followed by the treaty of Lagos in 
1975, which was established for it member states, to achieve a large trading avenue through an 
economic and trading union, and also to serve as a peacekeeping force in the region.4 Conflicts in 
the region have largely been triggered by post election results and coups. The many peacekeeping 
operations Ghana has been involved include Congo in 1960, and the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
crises in the early 1990s. From the first President, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana has inherited part 
of its current foreign policy of Pan-Africanism. Geographical location could also be the reason for 
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its involvement in regional affairs. Ghana is located along the Gulf of Guinea and Atlantic Ocean, 
in the sub region of West Africa. Regional activities and African affairs in general, have always been 
a priority of Ghana's Foreign Policy5 [Afua, 2009]. Hence its membership and support for the 
OAU (now AU) and ECOWAS. 
          Dr. Nkrumah`s Pan-African ideology whose vision was to have a United States of Africa 
continues to be part of Ghana`s foreign policy agenda, as far as West Africa and the rest of Africa 
are concern.6 This has become a key element of development since it foster cooperation among 
Africans through regional integration such as ECOWAS. Series of developmental strategies in the 
early days of independence led to many initiatives devoted to liberating the continent did not yield 
much success. Felipe Herrera (1963) argues that, “economic integration is a response to political 
challenge, a political response that is also a political process”7 [Herrera, 1963]. The success of 
integration is essential for Africa. This explains why regional organization such as ECOWAS, is a 
key developmental avenue for member states. 
           Professor, F. S. Northedge (1918-1985), defined Foreign Policy as “the use of political 
influence in order to induce other states to exercise their law-making power in a manner desired by 
the states concerned: it is an interaction between forces originating outside the country’s borders 
and those working within them”.8 Willace (1991), states it as “the general orientation of one 
government towards other governments: building alliances and coalitions in pursuit of defined 
national interest and preferred models of international order”9. Webber & Smith (2002), also 
defined foreign policy as “the goals sought, values set, decisions made and actions taken by states, 
and national governments acting on their behalf, in the context of external relations of national 
societies. It constitutes an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national 
societies”10 [Webber & Smith, 2002]. Per these definitions, we can define Foreign Policy as a 
country`s policy on dealing with international issues and how it reacts to external events. These 
decisions are sometimes influenced by history, security, trade, political circumstances at a time, 
leadership status and national interest.  
            Ghana`s external policy objectives includes – opposition to any military alliance, apartheid, 
arm race, establishment of foreign military bases on the territories of member states, the 
strengthening of the United Nations, the democratization of international relations, socioeconomic 
development and the restructuring of the international economic system, as well as international 
cooperation on an equal footing. The above mentioned hence defines the policy and ideology of 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)11 [Bluwey, 2003]. This policy is one of the variables which 
influence Ghana`s foreign policy, and since the days of Dr. Nkrumah, different regimes have 
pursued the policy of non aligned in various ways. Ghana`s external priorities thus include 
maintaining good relations and co-operations with any country that may be interested in that co-
operations and ideologies. 
           Against this background, has Ghana always played a positive role in West African affairs? To 
what extent does Ghana`s founding ideologies of African unity and non aligned, manifest into 
regional affairs? How consistent or inconsistent has Ghana been, in the implementation of foreign 
policy objectives within the ECOWAS, between the periods of 1992-2016? These questions are 
important because, on the one hand, Ghana`s political reforms have reinforced the “role model” 
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status and somewhat established its image as a leader for political change on the African continent. 
On the other hand, several questions arise concerning Ghana’s role in managing the West African 
affairs. In March 1993, Togolese government accused Ghana for supporting an armed attack on the 
military camp at Lome, which led to the killing of 12 Ghanaians, and the arrest of Ghanaian charge 
d`affairs (diplomat) in Togo12[McCakie, 2004]. Regional issues such as the Togo crisis in 2005, 
Niger in 1999, and the Cote d`Ivoire crises in 2010-2011, were met with cautious silent from 
Ghanaian government. In addition to aiding in research on Ghana`s regional policy, this paper aims 
at adding to the many already written scientific research. Researchers such as, Evans (2007), 
Rodrigo (2011), Herbert (1996), and others have all touched on similar topic. While such efforts by 
recognized groups and entities have, in some cases, yielded positive results, there is still much work 
to be done to ensure that the grey areas in the literature concerning Ghana’s contribution to the 
peace and security and economic enhancement of  West Africa. 
            Although, the earlier works that is related to this paper were largely accepted, this paper 
seeks to analyze Ghana`s foreign policy direction in the West African region and how that ties into 
her contributions towards the attainment of the objectives and principles upon which ECOWAS 
policies are based.  
            The above objective would be achieved by focusing attention on  Ghana’s peace and 
security activities and how that ties into ECOWAS protocol which allows free movement of 
people, goods and services within the member states.  
The above notwithstanding, the selection of this theme is based on the understanding that, 
little scientific work has been done on the subtopic. Similarly, Birikorang (2007), contends that, “the 
absence of a well-defined and articulated defense policy document has sometimes resulted to 
Ghana`s negative response to crisis such as in Togo and Cote d’Ivoire”. This paper will further 
look into the wider ramifications of the potential threats that these pose to the state and its citizens.  
 
Basis for Ghana`s regional involvement: 
            Historically, Ghana’s sub-regional policy or relations with countries like Togo, Burkina 
Faso, Ivory Coast and Nigeria from the period between 1957-1981 has been an interesting case in 
point. Writing in 1992, Chazan  argued that bordered in the south, north, east and west by the Gulf 
of Guinea, Burkina Faso, Togo and, Cote d’lvoire respectively, the political history of Ghana has  
“embraced the most salient themes of the (post-colonial) African experience: instability, ideological 
experimentation.., and fundamental issues of governance [Chazan 1992: 300].   
            Successive governments after Nkrumah did follow some part of Non-Aligned policy which 
fosters cooperation among Africans through regional integration such as ECOWAS13 [Debrah, 
2002]. The 1992 constitution of Ghana could also be the reason for its commitment to 
international organizations. Part of Ghana`s constitution pays attention to treaty obligations and 
settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and “adhere to the principles enshrined in 
or as the case may be, the aims and ideals of the UN Charter, the OAU Charter, the 
Commonwealth, the ECOWAS Treaty and any other organization of which Ghana is a member.”14 
Membership of these organizations provide Ghana with a platform for protecting some of its 
interests, as well as to establish itself as a leader on several issues of concern to the African 
continent. Through the UN and ECOWAS for example, Ghana has been able to engage in 
numerous peacekeeping missions, which earns it international respect as a partner for global 
stability and a moral leader in African affairs. It is important to state that, while peacekeeping 
activities come with its own cost (human lives and casualties), Ghana’s involvement in international 
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13 E.M. Debrah, ‘Lessons from Ghana’s Foreign Policy Since Independence.’ Paper presented at a Workshop on 
‘Ghana’s Foreign policy Options’ organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana. 2002. 
p. 27 
14 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana: The Directive Principles of State Policy. Chapter 6, Article 40. 
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peacekeeping functions aim at raising funds for its military due to scarce resources.15 Ghana devotes 
much attention to this type of foreign policy and also considers it to be an internal issue, since 
regional conflicts could potentially move into its territory and affect internal security16 [Emma 
2007]. Policies such as participation in regional peacekeeping are considered important to national 
well-being and the security of the country. 
Hebert Howe (1996/97), for instance, argues that, “States often lack adequate military and 
police forces to control many of these conflicts”, and adds that, “Western nations, often hesitate to 
help police conflicts which do not threaten their own vital interests, and the West and the United 
Nations have argued that sub-regional organizations and individual states should assume increasing 
security responsibilities”17 [Hebert 1996/97]. Under President Rawlings (1992-2000), Ghana was 
opposed to meddling in other countries affairs. That was a departure of Dr. Nkrumah`s Non-
Aligned policy. His government believed in the principle of political freedom and social 
development without interfering in other country`s affairs. In the case of the Cote d’Ivoire coup 
(1999) for instance, Mr. Rawlings government condemned the act and suspended co operations 
with Cote d’Ivoire. But in the case of the April 1999 coup in Niger, the Ghanaian government 
responded differently. Although they condemned the act, Mr. Rawlings did not establish any strong 
relations with Niger as he did with counties such as Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria18 [Nuamah, 2012]. 
Although Mr. Rawlings led his ECOWAS colleagues to establish the ECOMOG (Economic 
Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group) force to enforce and keep the 
peace in Liberia. For most of his years, Ghana was less willing to unilaterally condemn military 
takeovers but nevertheless, he worked through regional institutions to promote reconciliation and a 
return to constitutional rule. 
           In spite of the ideological position and leadership style, Ghana`s response to regional crises 
has not been as readily forthcoming as in others. For example, while Ghana remained silence on 
the Togolese crises in 2005, it was actively involved in the Ivorian peace process in 2002. Ghana, 
Nigeria and South Africa were at the forefront of the mediation before an International Working 
Group (IWG) was established to resolve the crisis 19[Kwesi, 2007]. Such scenarios certainly 
contradict it own constitution. As mentioned earlier, the constitution of Ghana is clear in its 
dealings with other nations. The Directive Principles of State Policy, state its commitment to the 
principles and objectives upon which ECOWAS policies are based.20 The question here is, has 
Ghana got any clear-cut and pragmatic Foreign Policy in the region, or it`s just being reactionary? 
Relations with regional neighbours have always been influenced by national interests. 
            The National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) pursued the 
country’s foreign policy objectives towards Burkina Faso, Cote d’ Ivoire, Togo and Nigeria in a 
conservative manner. Essentially, the foreign policy behaviour of the two regimes towards the four 
West African countries among others reflected ‘orthodox diplomacy and ideology’; it has been 
described as politics as usual [Agyeman-Duah and Dadieh 1 994:43]. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional integration of Ghana View Article: DOI: www.mfa.gov.gh/index.php  
16 Emma Birikorang “Ghana`s Regional Security Policy: Cost, benefits and consistency” Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC) Accra, Ghana. Paper No20. September 2007. p2. 
17 Hebert Howe “Lessons of Liberia and Regional Peacekeeping” International Security, Vol.21 No3, pp.145-179 (The 
MIT Press, 1996/97) 
18 “Evaluation of Ghana's position on democracy challenges abroad” Source: Kwaku Nuamah. View Article: DOI: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/soccer/Evaluation-of-Ghana-s-position-on-democracy-challenges-
abroad-30083 
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Ghana`s Involvement in ECOWAS peacemaking: 
            Regional peacemaking remain relevant in today’s West Africa for a number of reasons: It 
provides an opportunity for a country to use its scarce resources for other internal development, it 
is also an opportunity for a country to test its military might. As mentioned earlier, Ghana’s 
involvement in international peacekeeping functions is sometimes also driven more by a desire to 
raise funds for its military than peace and security concerns. Ghana has benefited from 
programmes such as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) from the United States State, and the African 
Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP), from the United Kingdom Government21 [Birikorang, 2007]. 
Aside the training assistance it gets from these countries, Volman (2001-2003), adds that, “Law 
enforcement officers’ lifestyles are enhanced and they attain a broader perspective on areas such as 
human rights, different peacekeeping methods, and the image of Ghana on the international front22 
[Volman, 2001-2003]. The United Nations (UN), refer peacemaking as “action to bring hostile 
parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of 
the Charter of UN, Pacific Settlement of Disputes”(UNODC 2009: 3).23 As Kehinde Bolaji (2011), 
also contends, peacemaking is the “diplomatic effort intended to move a violent conflict into non 
violent dialogue, where differences are settled through representative political institutions”. The 
objective of peacemaking is thus to have a lasting solution between parties involved24 [Kehinde, 
2011]. 
          Although the initial purpose of ECOWAS was to promote economic integration for it 
members, the organization expanded its mission to deploy military forces into Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Guinea Bissau in 1990, 1997, and 1998, respectively, and then to Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia in 
2003. These interventions opened up new avenues for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Though Ghana`s participation in the mission had initially been motivated by national 
interest, it later led to stabilizing peace and security in Liberia. However, some accounts suggest 
that, Ghana initially encouraged the idea of intervention, with a plan to rescue Ghanaians trapped at 
the embassy in Monrovia. It is therefore true to state that, Jerry Rawlings` decision to intervene in 
Liberia was mainly to rescue Ghanaians whose lives were under serious threat, than on 
peacemaking concerns.25 Rawlings also thought the importance to include the regional leader 
(Nigeria) to generate international approval.26 While the Liberian crisis reveals several common 
inconsistencies in Ghana`s regional policy, ECOMOG’s intervention established several important 
precedents. On the other hand, Ghana was a member of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation 
Committee (SMC) which brokered the first ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia that was signed by the 
three warring factions at the time. A number of peace agreements were brokered by former 
President Jerry Rawlings who was ECOWAS chairman in 1994.27 It has since been involved in 
preventive diplomacy in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Togo, Cote d`Ivour, Niger and other flashpoint in 
the sub-region. Kehinde argues that, “the role of regional organizations and their influence 
                                                 
21 Emma Birikorang “Benefits of Regional Security Involvement” Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training 
Centre, Accra. KAIPTC Paper No. 20, September 2007. 
22 Daniel Volman, “US Military Programs in sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-2003”. View Article: DOI:  
www.dvolman@igc.org  
23 UN Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) 2009. “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A 
Threat Assessment.”Vienna, AT: UNODC. 
24Kehinde A. Bolaji “adapting traditional principles” The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. African Conflict 
& Peacebuilding Review, issue 1, volume 2 pgs. 183–204. (Indiana University Press, Fall 2011) 
25 Interview with Mr. Victor Gbeho, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Representative of the ECOWAS 
Chairman in Liberia. June 15 2006.  
26 Ibid 
27 The Akosombo Agreement, 12 September 1994; Accra Acceptance and Accession Agreement, 21 December 1994; 
Accra Agreement on the Clarification of the Akosombo Agreement 21 December 1994. 
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contributed to the decline of the Cold War, and ECOWAS duly took advantage of these changes in 
international politics”28 [Kehinde, 2011]. 
          Regimes after Rawlings also exhibited some level of inconsistencies in their regional policy. 
In 2003, many expected Ghana to arrest President Taylor of Liberia and send him to the Special 
Court in Sierra Leone, while attending ECOWAS peace talks in Accra. This is after the Court had 
ordered for Mr. Taylors arrest for his alleged involvement in the conflict in Sierra Leon. In 2002, 
this special court was approved by the United Nations, to try those responsible for the crimes 
committed during the civil war. If the constitution of Ghana clearly adheres to the principles of the 
UN charter, what then prevented Ghanaian authorities, led by the then President Kufuor, to act on 
the court`s instructions?.29 Although Ghana`s decision on this matter was seen as strategic, it also 
exposed some level of mistrust and inconsistency in its regional policy, on two vital reasons. First, 
with respect to the fact that, the crises was regional issue, and as a member of ECOWAS, it only 
needed to respect the principles and objectives upon which ECOWAS policies are based. Secondly, 
the primary concern of ECOWAS then was to have a ceasefire in Sierra Leone, since it has 
encountered some problems in the process of carrying out its objectives, due to political instability 
and bad governance in some member countries30 [Obadan, 2003]. 
         
Ramification of Ghana`s Involvement in ECOWAS protocols. 
          The West African region is rich in diversity. Its countries differ significantly from one 
another with regard to history, economic potential, geography, culture, and political systems. While 
Ghana would form a firm partnership at ECOWAS, the goals of member states cannot be identical 
in every respect. As Steven (2010), points out, “countries across the region share common 
characteristics, one of the clearest patterns since the mid-1990s has been significant divergence in 
economic performance and political change. These differences make it increasingly ill-advised to 
treat the region as a single entity”31 [Steven, 2010]. Ghana's foreign policy attaches great importance 
to economic diplomacy such as the promotion of trade. Hence, its commitment to ECOWAS 
protocols which include free movement of goods and services that has created common market for 
West Africa.  
         The African continent is a home to many military peace operations, representing 
approximately 70% of the UN’s worldwide deployments32 [Williams 2009: 3 4]. The sub-Saharan 
region has witnessed most of these instabilities —with its vast natural resources, the West African 
region remains one of the poorest in the world33 [Sesay 2005]. These glaring stats among others, 
inform Ghana`s commitment to regional peace and security with the hope that, these conflicts 
doesn’t split into its territory. While Ghana takes credit for these attributes: Is Ghana fully 
committed to its regional policy objectives and principles upon which ECOWAS policies are based. 
Ghana took strategic stance for being silent, on the coup d’état in neighbouring Togo in the early 
2000s, at the time when the Togolese government was accusing Ghana for masterminding the act.34 
While ECOWAS and its leaders condemned the undemocratic actions in Togo, Ghanaian officials 
were silent on the matter. It took repeated pressure from ECOWAS and other international 
organizations to prompt the Ghanaian government to issue a statement on the situation in Togo. 
                                                 
28 Ibid, Kehinde A. Bolaji  pgs. 183–204  
29 Interview by Ofeibia Quist-Arcton with President J.A. Kufuor, President of the Republic of Ghana and Chairman of 
ECOWAS, July 16, 2003. View Article: DOI:  www.allafrica.com 
30 Obadan, M.I. National Development Planning and Budgeting in Nigeria: Some Pertinent Issues, Lagos: (Broadway 
Press Ltd, 2003). 
31 Steven Radelet: “Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way (Center for Global Development, 
Washington, D.C., 2010) 
32 Williams, P. 2009. “Peace Operations in Africa: Seven Challenges, Any Solutions?” Conflict Trends 3: 3–10. 
33 Sesay, A. 2005. The West African Scene: A Geopolitical and Socio-Economic Survey and Analysis. Text of a lecture 
delivered to Course 14 of the National War College. Abuja, Nigeria, September 22. 
34 Ghanaian Chronicle “The Furore Over Pres.Kufuor`s Visit To Ghana” (6 Febuary 2001, Accra) View Article: DOI: 
www.allafrica.com/stoeies/200102070193.html 
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This contradicts the case of Cote d’Ivoire, where immediately after the coup in September 2002; 
Ghana issued a statement condemning the coup and called for the immediate return to 
constitutional rule35.  
Historically, the government of Ghana entreated the Togolese government in January 1993 
to ensure that an acceptable programme was instituted to return the country to constitutional rule 
[West Africa, February 8-14, 19 3:207]. The Ghanaian government was of the view that the political 
and security situation in Togo was not good for democracy as well as peace, and security in the sub 
region. The influx of refugees from Togo as a result of the crisis there called for the creation of a 
temporary refugee camp at Klikor in the Volta Region of Ghana. A statement from the 
government of Ghana hinted that the Ghana Armed Forces had been put on “third degree alert” 
and was contemplating bringing back home some of its troops serving abroad as a result of the 
crisis in Togo [West Africa, February 8-14, 19 3:207].  The Togolese government argued that it was 
prepared to fight till the last man and would not entertain any form of destabilization from the 
Ghanaian government. 
            Again on March 1993, the Togolese government accused Ghana of an alleged attack on its 
main military garrison, which resulted in the death of its Military Chief of Staff, General 
Mawulikplimi Ameyl and the Deputy Chief of staff, Colonel Kofi Tetteh [West Africa, April 5-11, 
1993:545]. The Ghanaian government vehemently denied the accusations and expressed disgust at 
the Togolese government’s paranoia at blaming Ghana for every act of aggression against it, and 
cautioned the Togolese government to desist from doing that which had the potential to 
unnecessarily raise tension between the two countries [West Africa, April 5-11, 1993:545]. 
            On 15th October, 2003, the government of Ghana did not miss the opportunity to express 
its desire to see peace come to Cote’d’lvoire especially when a delegation from the EU was in 
Ghana on October 15 2003, to confer with President Kuffour on matters of peace and security in 
the West Africa Sub region [Daily Graphic October 17 2003: 3]. The president called on the UN to 
assume control of the peace keeping operations in Cote d’lvoire since the involvement of the UN 
would put the peace process on a sound footing and create the enabling environment for the 
warring factions in the conflict to work within the framework of the Marcousis and Accra Accords. 
He added that it was necessary for the UN to help the ECOWAS to deal with sub regional conflicts 
as soon as practicable. Again, on October 19, 2003, he conferred with Gbagbo at Akosombo as 
part of diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Cote d’Ivoire. Similarly, he held discussions with 
prominent lvorian rebel leaders and Alassane Ouattara, previous Ivorian Prime Minister as well as 
with representatives of the UN and the ECOWAS. Serious impediments to the Lina-Marcoussis 
Accord during 2004 let to the Accra III Accords in Ghana on July 30, 2004. The Accra III 
Agreeent reasserted the terms of the Lina- Marcoussis Accord with “specific deadlines and 
benchmarks for progress” [Daily Graphic October 20 2003: 3.]. 
            Further crisis in Cote d’lvoire called for another meeting in the Nigeria capital, Abuja in 
November 2004. Ghana was among the six countries that met. Matters got out of hand when 
Ivorian forces attcked towns in the north of the country killing nine French peace keepers and a US 
citizen. The French destroyed the Ivorian air force in retaliation. At the end of their one-day 
summit, the leaders called on the international community to place an arms embargo on Cote 
d’lvoire without delay. This was duly done on November 15 2004 [Daily Graphic November, 17 
2004: 5]. 
However, in 2010-2011, Ghanaian government chose to remain silent on the Cote d`Ivoire 
crises. This is after several countries and international organizations such as the UN, AU and 
ECOWAS have recognized the opposition leader as the legitimate president of the country36 [Aning 
                                                 
35 “Evaluation of Ghana's position on democracy challenges abroad” Source: Kwaku Nuamah. View Article: DOI: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/soccer/Evaluation-of-Ghana-s-position-on-democracy-challenges-
abroad-30083 
36 Kwesi Aning & Samuel Atuobi “The Challenges of The Côte d'Ivoire Crisis For West Africa: Exploring Options For 
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& Atuobi, 2011]. Noting the fact that, over one million Ghanaians live in La Côte d'Ivoire. Ghana 
initially announced that, it will not send any troops into the country, on grounds that its men are 
already in peacekeeping operations elsewhere.37  
              In responding to the crisis at a press briefing, President Mills did not consider what 
Ghana`s first President said, “The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up to 
the total libration of Africa” –he rather surprised the media with a local expression “Dzi wo fie 
asem” (Mind your own business), stating that, Ghana cannot choose a President for Côte d'Ivoire. 
This is one proclamation that shocked the large mass of stakeholders. While this clearly contradicts 
the Non-Aligned policies, which fosters cooperation among Africans through regional integration 
such as ECOWAS, it can also be seen as disappointment and betrayal to the ECOWAS. Whichever 
way we look at it, one would have thought that Prof. Mills would have been more vocal on issues 
affecting the African continent, just as Nkrumah did. This is the President who saw Nkrumah as a 
role model. For instance, in his first year in office, President Atta Mills ordered the birth date of Dr. 
Nkrumah as a national holiday. Could regime in power be the reason for these possible 
inconsistencies? How does the founding ideals of non-aligned policy which objectives include, 
democratization of international relations, reconcile with such acts? Or Ghana's foreign policy 
which is committed to maintaining friendly relations and co-operations with all countries that desire 
such co-operations? 
         The killing of 44 Ghanaian nationals in the Gambia in 2005 saw deterioration in Ghana-
Gambia relations, after Ghana accused Yahya Jammeh of Gambia and his military for the killings.38 
The then minority spokesperson for foreign affairs John Mahama, (who served as President of 
Ghana from 2012-2016), urged all Ghanaians not to welcome Mr. Jammeh, who was scheduled for 
an African Union summit in Accra. His call eventually made Mr. Jammeh cancel his trip to the AU 
summit.39 With its “role model” status and influential actor at ECOWAS, one expected Ghana to 
act in a way that does not affect their diplomatic relations, since both are members of this 
organization. While this issue has not been resolved, Mr. Mahama`s recent visit to the Gambia 
again raises concern, over whether Ghana has got a clear cut foreign policy towards the sub-
region.40  
         Finally, Nigeria`s security challenges which started in 2009, saw the formation of a 
Multinational Joint Force (MNJTF):41 —with Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Benin to fight Boko 
Haram, that has killed thousands in northeast Nigeria. Again, Ghana`s exclusion from this group is 
still a mystery since the Islamist group are increasingly threatening neighbouring countries. Republic 
of Benin, who has not been affected by this terrorist acts, for instance, saw the importance of this 
joint force. Nigeria`s instability is adversely a blow for Ghana. Aning (2007) believes that 
“Migratory flows of Nigerians seeking zones of peace would almost certainly ruin the economies of 
a country such as Ghana, and states much further afield”. But more critically, such scenarios could 
also lead to the loss of a key continental stabilization anchor —a sub-regional leader42 [Aning, 
2007]. This clearly shows that, where strategic economic and personal interests are as stake, 
Ghanaian leaders have chosen cooperation and friendship over condemnations.43 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
A Negotiated Settlement” (Policy Brief, 4 January 2011) p.3 
37 Ibid 
38 Report: “Gambian President Ordered Killing of Ghanaians” - Reveals Top Govt Official. View Article: DOI: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/diaspora/Gambian-President-Ordered-Killing-of-Ghanaians -Reveals-
Top-Govt-Official-110360 
39 Yahya Jammeh excuses AU Summit View Article: DOI: http://www.modernghana.com/newsthread1/138597/4/ 
40 President of Ghana, John Maham visited Gambia in 2015. View Article: DOI:  www.newsghana.com.gh 
41 A Regional Multinational Joint Task Force to Combat Boko Haram.View Article: DOI: 
http://pncp.net/news/regional-multinational-joint-task-force-combat-boko-haram 
42 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning “Africa: Confronting Complex Threats” p11.(International Peace Academy, 2007) 
43 Democracy Coalition Project, Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002. View 
Article: DOI: www.demcoalition.org 
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Conclusion and Recommendations: 
The year 1992, was a period that saw the introduction of constitution to be used in 
governance, and also marked the start of democracy in Ghana. Hence, the only document that 
defines and guides courses of action in Ghana’s foreign policy is the 1992 Constitution. These 
include, strengthening of the United Nations, democratization of international relations, 
socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system, as well as 
international cooperation on an equal footing, maintaining friendly relations and co-operation with 
all countries that desire such co-operation on the basis of mutual respect and adherence to the 
principles and charter obligations of international organisations to which Ghana belongs.44 In view 
of the activities and roles it plays in ECOWAS, there is the need for Ghana to have a 
comprehensive defence and national security policy. This will guide the decisions and actions of 
future governments in their interactions within the region. This leads to the hypothesis that, lack of 
a well-defined and articulated defence policy document has somewhat resulted in inconsistencies in 
responding to crisis such as those in Niger, Cote d’Ivoire and the Gambia. These are sometimes 
difficult for ECOWAS, to predict what to expect from its member states in terms of commitment 
to agreed protocols and decisions.  
              As a developing country, Ghana should pursue foreign policy which favours all actors of 
the international community. This is to avoid friction between member states, especially its 
immediate neighbours and the wider world. Also, efforts should be made to strengthen Ghana`s 
commitment to international organizations, namely Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), African Union (AU), United Nations Organisation (UNO), Non-Aligned-Movement, 
and the Commonwealth of Nations. Finally, measures should be taken to promote economic 
growth. Although the Non-Aligned policy has helped Ghana to strengthen its international 
cooperation on an equal footing, the discussion revealed that, part of Ghana`s foreign policy has 
been influenced by the need for external economic assistance which has influenced most decisions 
taken in the past. To stem this problem, Ghana`s economy should be diversified from over 
dependent on external sources. The regional bloc remains important for Ghana; —its economic 
and political dispensations. If Ghana is to play a significant role in ECOWAS, it must vigorously 
involve itself in the move toward an improved policy framework in the sub-region.  
 
List of Acronyms 
ECOWAS              Economic Community of West African States 
FP                          Foreign Policy 
AL                         Arab League 
AU                         African Union   
EU                         European Union 
ECOMOG             Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
UN                         United Nations 
WAS                       West African States 
NAM                      Non- Alignment Movement 
PNDC                    Provisional National Defence Council 
UNO                      United Nations Organisation 
UK                         United Kingdom 
MNJTF                   Multinational Joint Force  
ACPP                     African Conflict Prevention Pool 
ACOTA                 African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance  
                                                 
441992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. See also Hon. Hackman Owusu-Agyeman, ‘Ghana’s 
Foreign Policy under the Kufuor Administration’, Paper presented at a Workshop on ‘Ghana’s 
Foreign policy Options’ organized by the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of 
Ghana. 2002. 
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ACRI                      African Crisis Response Initiative  
WA                         West Africa 
NPP                        New Patriotic Party 
IWG                       International Working Group 
OAU                      Organisation of African Unity  
NDC                      National Democratic Congress 
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